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The purposes of this paper are to examine the relationship between Japanese foreign direct 
investment (FDI) and Japanese exports to China sínce the Open Door Policy , and to make 
some observations about Chinese expectations for and assessment of Japanese technology 
transferal. Multiple regression analysis is carried out and it is found that in most sectors, FDI 
啞巴竺旦旦influenci ng factor on exports. In thc 1980s it appears that Japanese investors were 
most interested in producing goods for export, but in the 1990s, they have become more 
interested in selling their products to the Chinese market. The Chinese Government had 
hoped that all foreign investors would bring their latest technologies, but Jnany Chinese people 
believe that Japanese investors have not been doing so, and an independent survey carried out 
in 1985 supports th1 S belief. Japanese investors are not unique in delaying the transfer oftheir 
technologies. However, in recent years export growth has declined, while FDI growth has 
risen. This would seem to infer that China will gain fronl lnore and a wider variety of 
technology. 
Introduction 
A considerable amount has been written since the 1960s about the relationship between 
foreign direct investment (FDI) and trade. Attention has focused on identifying and 
distinguishing the particular factors motivating foreign direct investment from those of 
exporting, and on understanding the relative timing of each (Chenery, 1960; Linnen1ann, 
1966; Hymer, 1976; Kojima 1973; Lipsey and Weis丸 1981 & 1984, etc.). The specific 
purposes of this paper are to gain a better understanding 雪 using statistical techniques, of the 
relationship between Japanese FDI and Japanese exports to China since the beginning of 
China's Open Door Policy , and to COlllment generally on Chinese expectatiolls for and 
assessment of Japanese technology transferal. 
While a great deal of descriptive material has been wrÏtten about Japanese economic 
relations with Chjna in general (Campbell, 1987; Howe, 1990; Taylc汀， 1993), there seems to 
have been very little theoretical research on Japanese trade and FDI to China. Kojima (1 978) 
and Ozawa (1 979) have carefu l1y surveyed and analysed total Japanese FDI around the world. 
y okoi (1990) and Ono (1992) have discussed the relationship between investment and trade 
in China alone, but have not employed a statistical model. Kinoshita (1995) only makes 
casual observations about the detenninants of Japanese FDI in China" The Sumitomo Life 
Insurance Research Institute (1989) appears to have published a short theoretical piece, but 
it was not available to the author. A Chinese econonlist, Zhang Zhaoyang (1 995), has 
employed statistical techniques to test the relationship between trade and investrnent in China, 
but his is a general study encompassing all of China's lllain trade partners. 
Trends in Ja口anes~E主旦旦旦乏主o China 
PiPl哩竺ic relatiQns between J apan and China were normalized in 1972. After that 
date a number of trad且更堅即llts_ were signed !eading up to enormous C0111n1it且也1s-lmder
亟百副刊同諾言and Friendship and Long Term Trade Agreement in 1978. Under this 
agreement Japan was to export vv'hole plants, and the relevant technolog)心 co些竺些且on
materials and equipment in exchange mainly for oil and coal. At the beginning of the study 
interval, 1980, China was relying on Japan for the largest share of Îts imports. At that time 
Jap豆豆3三品unted for 26 .40/0 of the total, followed by the United States with 19.6% and Hong 
Kong and Macao with 2.90/0. 1\" 
Ovεr the past decade and a half, China has reduced its dependency on Japan. 
According to the most recent data available, out oftotal impQ!ts in 199手 22.8~/o came 台om
Èpa丸 )2.2% fron1 Taiwan, 12.1 % from the United States and 8.30/0 from Hong Kong and 
Macao: The trade relationship is far from balanced. China depends Jnuch ~金主豆豆且Japan as 
an e妞2~t ~_ark~t than Japan depends on China. Out of all of Japan's expo肘， 3.9%w哩t to 
China in 1980 and 4.80/0 in 1993. In 1980 ~ 20.1 % of Chin的 exports w叫 to Japan，且ι
17.80/0 in 1994. 
The growth rate of Japanese exports to China has not been steady. (See Table 1.) By 
1984, household incolne levels were increasing sharply and, concomitantly, the demand for 
imported consumer goods. Di sastrous旬 ， at the san1e time , however, China' s supplies of 
foreign exchange were dwindling at a rapid rate. One cause was the decentralization of 
Tab1e 1: Annua1 Real Growth Ratesof Japanese Exports and Manufacturing FDI to 
China 1981-1994 (%) 
P?i o ρiv qu R hhb汁川1rAH叭
O
OP TAVA
叫
GE 
Growth Rate of 
FDI 
1981 -6.75 108.78 
1982 -28.69 -19.39 
1983 38.94 -84.67 
1984 45.70 2,860.52 
1985 74.74 -11 .49 
1986 -31 .46 68.14 
1987 -22.62 379.69 
1988 6.98 -78.50 
1989 -9.15 56.53 
1990 -28.69 -17.65 
1991 38.22 52.71 
1992 37.29 75.25 
1993 40.37 40.86 
1994 4.75 4 1.88 
Sources: Calculated from data faxed from the Japanese Ministry of Finance and from the 
Japanese Economic Yearbook (various years). 
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control over foreign exchange which was leading alarmingly to the total depletion of the 
country's foreign reserves. Secondly, the oil deposits in the northeast of China were producing 
far short of initial expectations. This was a very serious setback for the country's economic 
reforms. 1n the ear1y 1980s oil had been the largest source of foreign exchange and it was 
hoped that oil sales would pay for most of China' s Ìlnports for many years to come, much as 
they had for several 孔1iddle Eastern countries. 
Thus in 1985 the government had to take drastic measures to curtail the flow of imports 
into the country. In addition to the shortfall in northeast oil production there were other factors 
putting downward pressure on imports of Japanese goods. In 1985 anti-Japanese 
demonstrations staged by Chinese university students called for an end to the Japanese 
"invasion". They believed that the Japanese were providing only low technology to China and 
were discriminating against Chinese products, making it impossible to reduce the trade surplus. 
1n July 1986 the yuan was depreciated in an attempt to reduce the propensity to import, 
especially from Japan, with whom China had a very large deficit. The almost concurrent 
appreciation of the yen after the Plaza Accords was yet another factor as was the June 4th 
1ncident, though the effects of this were short-livεd. Total exports in 1990 were about half 
what they were in 1985, but rose steadily thereafter. The average real growth rate between 
1991 and 1993 was about 39%, but fell sharply to only 4.750/0 in 1994. 
The percentage breakdown of the exports since 1980 given in Table 2 shows that they 
have been consistently dominated by he~ chemical and industrial products. Of this, iron and 
steel products and general machinery were the largest sub-categories. However, there were 
notable shifts. Iron and steel products went from accounting for 27.0% of total exports in 1980 
to only 120/0 in 1994, while electrical machinery rose from 9.5% in 1980 to 21. 80/0 in 1994. 
Transportation equipment went from 8.2% in 1980 up to 17.60/0 in 1985 , and down to 10.60/0 
in 1994. Of the light industrial products, textile products was the largest sub-category and its 
share fluctuated from 7.9% to 3.80/0 to 9.7%. \ 
Trends in J apanese F oreign Direct Investment in China 
Since 1960, the government' s insistence on economic independence precluded virtually 
all FDI to China from Japan, or from any other country. In 1983 , by far the largest proportion 
of China' s total actually used FDI , 51.60/0 , came from Hong Kong and Macao. Japan came 
next with 20 .40/0 and the United States a distant third with 9.1 0/0. It must be pointed out that 
due to tense political relations, at the beginning of the study interval Taiwan was investing in 
China indirectly through Hong Kong世 but in the late 1980s there was direct investment. By 
1994, Japan's portion had fallen to fourth place with only 6.1 %, Hong Kong and Macao's 
increased to 59.90/0 , Taiwan ranked second with 10.0% and the United States was third with 
7.3%. Part of the very large proportion from Hong Kong and Macao is actually Mainland 
money. Though no figures are available, it is well known that many Mainland investors have 
set up front companies in Hong Kong to make use of the special investment terms granted to 
foreign investors. 
As a proportion of wor1dwide Japanese lnanufacturing FDI , the amount destined for 
China has been very smal l. It went from 1. 1 % in 1983 to 1.0 in 1990, then climbed to 4.5% 
in 1994. To give perspective, 41.30/0 went to the United States in 1990多 29.7% to Europe, 5.2% 
3 
Table 2: Percentage Breakdown of Japanese Exports to China 
1980 1985 1994 
F oodstuffs neg 0.2 0.3 
Raw Materials & Fuel s 0.5 0.7 2.8 
Light lndustrial Products 
Textile Products 
12.2 
7.9 
7.1 
3.8 
15.2 
9.7 
Other Light lndustrial Products 3.6 
Heavv Chemical& lndustrial 
Products 
ChemicaIs 
86.1 91.0 80.8 
10.7 5.7 7.3 
扎1etals
lron & Steel 
Nonferrous Mctals 
33.1 
27.0 
1. 1 
28.3 
25.6 
1.3 
14.5 
12.0 
0.9 
Metal Products ' 5.0 1.4 
fo --
... 
Machinerv & Equi口nlent 42 .3 57.0 59.0 
General Machinery 23.1 16.5 25.0 
Electrical Machinery 9.5 20.6 21.8 
Transportation Equipment 8.2 17.6 10.6 
Precision lnstrunlents 1.6 2.2 l.5 
Source: Ministry of International Trade and lnd的try. (1980-1995) White Papers on 
lnternational Trade. Tokyo. 
Note: "_" means there was nothing reported for that category. Some category groupings 
changed over the interva1. Category contents do not necessarily sum up. Only sub-
categones are glven. 
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to the NIEs, and 13 .1 % to the ASEAN cowltries. The figures for 1994 were 33.20/0 , 13.50/0 , 
6.1 % and 16.3% respectively (JETRO、 1994， 18). Compared to other countries, the 
proportion of Japan's tota1 FD1 devoted to lllanufacturing in China has been small, while the 
proportion devoted to service industries such as real estate, conlmerce and construction, has 
been 1arge. 
Table 3 gives the breakdown of Japanese manufacturing FD1 in China from 1980 to 
1994. During the first four years of the Open Door Policy , investnlent was limited to only 
two or three sectors. 1n 1980, 73% of the investment was devoted to the electrical machinery 
sector wÏth the relnainder going to the chelnical sector. 1n the following year, 88% went to 
the chemical sector with the rest devoted to wood products勻 and in 1983 chemicals and wood 
were again the largest sectors. With little in the way of natural resources of its own, Japan 
was keen to develop these industries to maintain its own rate of economic growth. 
By 1984 the Japanese had begun to invest in the full range of manufacturing industries, 
including textiles, non-ferrous metal products, general lnachinery, transportation equipment, 
etc. Changes in the dominant sector of investment over the period reflect changing Japanese 
priorities. 1n 1984 ~ the largest proportion, almost 500/0 , was in food products. The main 
sector was chelnicals in 1985 and 1986, electrical machinery in 1987世 1988 and 1989, general 
machinery in 1990, and electrical machinery again from 1991 to 1994. Obviously there was 
keen interest in developing China's electrical machinery sector. Not only was it the recipient 
of the largest investment for much of the period, but its relative proportion was often 
considerably higher than the second largest category, which for most years was textiles. 
Looking at year-on-year trends, it can be seen that after 1984 the relative importance 
of the foodstuffs sector steadily declined. After an initial spurt, investment in wood products 
was quite limited after 1983 , and investnlent in chemical products dropped sharply in 1984 
and again in 1987. Generally speaking, the trend was upward for textiles, non-ferrous metal 
products, transportation machinery , and especially for electrical machinery. 
The overall trend in total FDI for the period was upward, but yearly increments v/ere 
markedly uneven. (See Table 1) Between 1979 and 1981 when the Chinese government was 
trying to do too much too fast , and oil revenues did not reach anticipated levels, there were 
alarming investment reversals. 1n a11, about 300 agreements were withdrawn or postponed, 
including several ln句 or projects such as Phase n of the Baoshan Steel Complex. Japanese 
investors were the n10st affected. 1n 1983 a tax treaty was signed b巳tween the two countries 
preventing double taxatioll. This was a major factor causing the huge influx of investment 
in 1984. After the sharp 乳ppreciation in the yen in the mid-1980s many firms in Japan 10st 
their competitive edge and scratnb1ed to continue production in China where costs were much 
less. The increase in 1986 was due in part to the Chinese Government' s enacting of the 
"Provision of the State Council of the People's Republic of China for the Encouragement of 
the F oreign 1nvestment刊， offering investors a variety of new incentives. 1n 1988 several 
events occurred which stimulated investlnent in 1989: more coastal areas were designated as 
special zones for investment, the Japanese goverrnnent extended a third yen credit to China 
and the two countries signed a treaty protecting Japanese investors. 
1nvestment in 1990 fell somewhat due to the June 4th lncident the previous year, as 
well as to the government' s policies to control inf1ation. However, fr0 0.1 1991 to 1994, there 
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Food Products TeJ>.'tjle Products Wood Pi'üdi.i吾吾一一 I(汪古mlcãCt' rò'面CIS LVl巳Lal \...J CUÇj I 山 lVJ.a.VJJlllvJ. j ..J...I l "" ""''''且、n ι>v ~ .叫心t' ~.-.. _ .了~ - 一 I 
Products Products Machinery 
1980 446 1,235 1,68 1 
(1 ) (1 ) 1月)
198 1 3,460 484 3,944 
(2) (1) (3) 
1982 l ‘ 235 2,164 198 3,597 
(3) (0) (0) (3) 
1983 598 756 208 1,562 
(2) (0) (1) m 
1984 10‘ 065 1,236 340 1.461 1,015 1,303 594 4,382 20.396 
(9) (4) (1 ) (3) (2) (2) (3) (6) (30) 
1985 4,162 1,106 904 4.547 2,957 2.208 2,835 3,253 21 ,972 
(1 1) (5) (2) (6) (4) (6) (7) (10) (5 1 ) 
1986 2,857 650 602 3,85 5 1,604 1.854 3,375 2,2 15 16,922 
(14) (5) (2) ( 4) (1 ) (2) (3) (7) (38) 
1987 2,530 2,461 395 3,266 4,823 1,3 82 28,410 2,74 1 46,008 
( 11 ) (8) (2) (8) (6) (4) (11 ) (8) (58) 
1988 9.535 9.349 2,263 5,005 5,842 7,022 59,059 2,888 17,399 118,362 
(20) (6) (8) (8) (11 ) (1 5) (2) Q4) (11 7) 
1989 7.958 69 1 892 7.053 3,735 25.9R8 49 ‘ 487 745 24,743 12 1.292 
(6) (23) (3) ( 11 ) (5) (6) (14) (2) (1 5) (85) 
1990 5,738 13 ,392 857 7,449 8,858 32.0 13 14. 169 866 19,52 1 102,863 
(~ (40) (3) (6) (8) (6) (11 ) (2) (29) (1 13) 
1991 11.1 26 41 ,255 623 6.296 6步706 17.096 72,613 5,100 20,942 181 ,557 
(1 1) (87) (1) (6) (1 1) (5) (22) (2) (33) (178) 
1992 16,290 66,822 1,820 10.829 16,189 28.119 105,7 16 18,206 98,552 362,543 
(35) (187) (5) ( 18) ( 13) (~92 (34) (9) (6 1) (38 1) 
1993 33 .2 11 11 5,239 2 1.357 47,475 39,721 ll 3,903 165,11 7 4 1.27 1 107‘ 125 684‘ 41 9 
(39) (247) (20) (26) (29) (46) (57) (20) (95) (579) 
1994 60.506 154,236 4,656 46.682 73 ,674 60.706 228,596 104,189 128,217 86 1,462 
(30) (283 ) (5) (1 8) (38) (26) (66) (29) (63) (558) 
total 163,978 406 ,437 36,202 149,623 165 .570 291 ,306 73 1,915 173,859 429 ,690 2,548,580 
(1 94) 些ln ~ lJ5 ) (1 26) D~3) (2型) (69) (353) 旦旦空L
Table 3: Breakdown of Japanese FDI in China 1980-1994 (Real U.S . Dol1ars) 
Note: The number in parentheses are the number of projects 
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were notable increases and the Japanese were obviously becoming more keen on China as a 
destination for FDI. Amongst factors affecting FDI were the détente between the United 
States and the former Soviet Union. Japan's fears of weakening its security commitments 
with the United States by pursuing closer economic ties with China largely disappeared. 
Although Japan' s economic "bubble" burst in 1991 and total FDI worldwide fell sharply, 
China' s share actually increased. The average real growth rate of FDI to China was about 
53% between 1991 and 1994. 
Table 4 gives the average value of the Japanese investment projects in China 
in real terms. Generally speaking, the value of the projects (total FDI in a given year divided 
by the number of projects) increased by a factor of four or five. This would seem to indicate 
that as tÍlne went on the Japanese were gaInlng confidence in the Chinese business 
environment and willing to commit larger and larger sums. However, compared to the 
investment projects in the United States and other parts of Asia, the projects in China were 
still very small (Ono, 1992 型 25-26).
There are several ways direct investment can take place in China: equity joint ventures, 
contractual joint ventures, wholly foreign-owned enterprises, joint extraction and joint 
development (of natural resources), compensation trade, and processing and assembling 
agreements. The largest amount of Japanese investment has been in the form of equity joint 
ventures. The next largest has been about equally apportioned between contractual joint 
ventures and wholly foreign-owned enterprises. 
Most Japanese investment in the early 1980s went to the northeast, especially Liaoning, 
and Shandong, where the Japanese before World War II had held power in what was known 
as Manchur間， and to Shanghai which had been the largest commercial centre. In the 1990s, 
by far the largest alTIOunts were going to Shanghai, followed by Guangdong, Lioaning, Beijing 
and Jiangsu. Electric and electronic companies chose mainly Da1ian in Liaoning Province, 
Beijing, Shanghai, Guangdong, Jiangsu, Zhenjiang and Xian. Textile enterprises have 
favoured Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Shandong and Shanghai (Kinoshita, 1995 , 15-16). 
The Relationship Between Japanese Ex口orts and FD 1 in China 
In order to gain a better understanding of the relationship between Japanese exports 
and FDI to China, a series of mu1tiple regressions was run. The dependent variable was 
exports, while FDI and various other factors were the independent variables. For the sake of 
consistency, all data was from the Japanese Ministry of Finance and it was all converted into 
real Alnerican dollars. 
As the period under study is only fifteen years, and in many sectors there was little 
or no FDI during the first three years, the available data is not ideal for the employment of 
computer statistical techniques. It could be argued that it is apparent just from scanning the 
figures that FDI from year to year was highly erratic and did not seem to bear any relation 
to exports. However, it was thought that use of a mu1tiple regression model might reveal the 
relative influence of FDI and other factors on trends in exports. 
Another difficu1ty with the data (confirmed by a fax communication with an official 
7 
Food Textile Wood Cherrlical Non-Ferrous General Electricl Transportation 
Products Products Products Products Metal Machinelγ Electronic Machinery Others Total 
Products Products 
1980 446 1,235 841 
1981 1,730 484 1,315 
1982 412 1,l99 
299 208 521 
1984 1,118 309 340 487 508 652 198 730 680 
1985 378 22 1 452 758 739 368 405 325 431 
μ986 204 130 301 964 1,604 927 1,125 304 445 
1987 230 308 198 408 804 346 2,583 343 793 
1988 477 406 377 626 730 638 3,937 1,444 725 1,012 
1989 1.326 30 297 641 747 4.331 3.535 373 1,650 1427 
1990 717 335 286 1.242 1. 107 5,336 1,288 433 673 910 
199 1 1,011 474 623 1049 610 3.4 19 3,301 2,550 629 1,020 
1992 465 357 364 602 1,245 1,480 3,1 09 2,023 1 、 6 16 952 
1993 852 467 1,068 1,826 1,370 2,476 2,897 2,064 1,128 1,182 
1994 2β17 545 931 2,593 1,939 2.335 3,464 3,593 2 、 03 5 1,544 
tot31 845 446 670 1.301 1,314 2,190 3.012 2,512 1,217 1,159 
Table 4: Average Value of Japanese FDI Projects in China (Real U.S. Dollars) 
8 
of the Ministry of Finance May 1996) was that the FDI categories used by the Ministry are 
111uch less precise than the export categories, i.e. , there is an "electrical machinery" category 
for FDI, while the export data is subdivided into electrical circuit articles, television sets, 
colour television sets, videotape recorders, communication equipment and other electrical 
manufactures. This meant that the sectoral regressions were a11 rather wide. It would have 
been preferable to measure the relationship of exports and Fl)I by specific type of 
manufactured item, such as exports of television sets with FDI in the m.anufacture of 
television sets, instead of regressing the electrical machinery data as a whole. 
As the FDI data was so lin1ited it was imperative to use on ly a small number of 
independent variabl的。 Real GDP was used to represent growth of the economy, real GDP 
per capita was used to represent growih in spending power of the population, and retail sales 
(total and by sector) was used to represent buying propensity. Capital construction investment 
was used in some of the regressions to represent general infrastructural development of the 
economy. All of the independent variables were lagged by one year. lt seelned logical , no 
matter what effect FDI had on trade, that it did not occur sÎ1nultaneously with exports, but 
rather was delayed somevvhat. lndeed this procedure improved the results. A dUlnmy variable 
was inserted initially to offset the effects of the June 4th lncident, but was dropped as it 
rendered a11 results insignificant. The yearly variations in the data were such that it was 
unnecessary to cornpensate statistically for the fall in exports and in vestment following the 
lncident. The estimation equation was set up in the following form: 
where : 
X 
FDI 
GDP t-l 
log Xt =α。 +α1 logFDlt_1 +α2GDPt_1 +α3GDPpct_l 
+α410gINVt_l +α510gRET A1Lt_l +α6TREND +εl 
Exports (total 0τparticular sector) 
Foreign Direct Invest1nent (total or particular sector) 
Gross Donlcstic Product Laggcd By One Year 
GDPpct_l 
lNV t-l 
Gross DOlnestic Product Per Capita Lagged By One Year 
Capital Construction lnvestment Lagged B y One Year 
RETAIL t-l Retail Sales (total or partlcular sector) Lagged By One Year 
The en1pirical results were as fo11o\\'s: 
(Below the coefficient estimat郎， in parentheses , are their t statistics.) 
Total 恥1anufafl旦r!旦g Ex口orts
log ~ = 29.6814 + 0.0019 logFDlt- 0.0286 GDP叫(9 .464) (1.219) (-8.040) 
+0 .4 168 GDPpct_l -1. 8872 logRET AILt_1 + 0.0653 TREND (1 3.943) (-4.529) (2.422) 
R2 - adjusted = 0.9574 D.W. = 2.6265 F = 41 .4575 S.E. = 0.0711 
9 
These results indicate that total manufacturing exports were inf1uenced by the growth of the 
economy, spending power of the population and retail sales of manufactured goods. However, 
the coefficient for the FDI variable was insignificant, indicating that FDI had no influence on 
exports. The Durbin Watson statistic indicated an absence of first-order serial autocorrelation. 
Textile Products Exports 
log Xt = 24.1103 + 0.023610gFDlt_1 - 0.0]89 GDPt_1 (4 .482) (0 .401) (-2.173) 
+0.2909 GNPpct_l - 2.0689 logRETAILt_1 + 0.1408TREND (3 .482) (-2 .300) (3.030) 
R2 - adjusted = 0.9147 D.W. = 1.9892 F 二 20.3114 S.E. = O. 1253 
The structure of the results for textile exports was the Sa1ne as for total manufacturing exports. 
They were inf1uenced by the growth of the economy, spending power of the population, and 
retail sales of clothes, but not FDI. The coefficient for the FDI variable was the only one 
which was not significant at the 5% leve1. The signs were also identical and there was no 
autocorrelation. 
Electrical 孔1achinerv Ex口orts
log Xt 二 18 .4866 + 0.077910gFDlt_1 - 0.0244 GDP t-1 (1 4.842) (1. 374) (-4 .569) 
+ 0.2616 GDPpct_1 - 1.0230 logRETAILt_1+ 0.0694 TREND (5 .235) (-4.057) (2 .834) 
R2 - adjusted = 0.9138 D.W. = 2.6475 F = 20.0888 S.E. = 0.1056 
The structure of the results for electrical machinery was identical to the above two cases. 
Nonferrous Metal Products Exports 
log Xt =10 .4835 + 0.1810 logFDlt_1 - 0.0180 GDPt_1 (1 3.033) ( 1. 145) (-2.522) 
+0.2658 GDPpct_1 + 0.0014 logINVt_1 - 0.1511 TREND (2.654) (2.525) (-2 .945) 
R2 - adjusted = 0.8906 D.W. = 2.6081 F = 15.6508 S.E. = O. 1346 
Nonferrous metal products exports were also not inf1uenced by FDI. The factors which did 
influence exports were the same as in the above sectors, but instead of retail sales, the best 
AU --EEA 
results were obtained using the capital construction investment variable. This is logical as 
nonferrous metal products are used in construction and building. There was no autocorrelation. 
Transportation Equi口ment Ex口orts
logXt = 2 1.4793 - 0.0437 logFDlt_1 + 0.0555 GDPt_1 (38.003) (-1.318) (29 .422) 
+0.0052 logINV t-1 - 1.2250 TREND 
(25 .409) (-18.133) 
R2 - adjusted = 0.9996 D.W. 二 2.7681 F = 2995.7563 S.E. = 0.0147 
The results for transportation equipment exports indicate that they were not influenced by 
investment in transportation equipment. They wer巴， however, influenced by the growth of the 
economy and capital construction investment. There was no autocorrelation. 
General Machinerv Ex口orts
logXt =13.0302 + 0.028410gFDlt_1 + 0.1881GDPpct_1 (1 8.756) (0.223) (3.591) 
+ 0.0013 logINVt_1 - 0 .4012 TREND (2.507) (-2.959) 
R2 - adjusted = 0.7538 D.W. = 2.801 F = 7.8892 S.E.= 0.2127 
General machinery exports were also not inf1uenced by investment in the same sector. Like 
transportation equipment they were influenced by capital construction investment, but instead 
of growth of the economy, the other independent variable was spending power of the 
population. All signs were positive, and there was no autocorrelation. 
Food Products Exports 
logXt 二 -27.0230 十 0.5309 logFDlt_1 + 0.0573 GDPt_1 (-9.381) (11. 190) (13.974) 
- 0.3800 GDPpct_1 + O. 0009 logINVt_1 + 4.8287 RETAILt_1 (-10.303) (8.909) (1 2.740) 
- 0.4548 TREND 
( -13.943) 
R2 - adjusted = 0.9786 D.W. = 2.6540 F = 69 .4350 
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S.E.=0.0319 
The situation for food products exports was different in that they were influenced by FDI. The 
coefficient for FDI was positive and significant, implying a complementary relationship. The 
growth ofthe economy, spending power of the population , capital construction investment, and 
retail sales of food also influenced exports. All of the coefficlents were significant and there 
was no autocorrelation. 
Chemica1 Products EK坦白
log Xt = 12.6313 + 0.0639 logFDlt_1 + 0.0062 GDPt_1 (173.352) (1.989) (1 .889) 
+0.0578 TREND 
(7 .430) 
R2 - adjusted = 0.8676 D甸 w. = 1.6831 F = 27.2019 S.E. = 0.0989 
The coefficient for FDI in chemical products was also positive and significant. The only other 
variable whìch yielded significant results was growth of the economy. Inclusion of all 
combinations ofthe other independent variables rendered insignificant results. Thus FDI in this 
sector seelned to complement exports. There was again no indication of autocorrelation. 
In summary, Japan's exports to China were inf1uenced by several factors , but in only 
two sectors, food and chemical products, was FDI one of thern. Almost all of the coefficients 
for the FDI variables were highly insignificant, while for a11 the other independent variables 
there was strong significance at the 50/0 leve l. Thus, FDI generally had no inf1uence on exports 
and there was no crowding out whatsoever. 
Ex口ectationd旦旦d Assessment çfl也旦旦旦旦旦王旦chnolo立v T ransferal 
Soon after the fall of the Gang of Four, China's new leaders began to reverse the self-
reliance policies espoused by Mao Zedong. lt was realized that if the country was to modernize 
it had to acquire advanced tec1mology , and that the only way to acquire this was to develop 
export industries, invite foreign investors and obtain as much aid as possible. The governn1ent 
had high expectations that now the door was open foreign countries would quickly come förth 
with their technologies and China would soon catch up with the rest of the developed world. 
Many governn1ent documents detail the urgency for and faith in the workability of technical 
cooperation. Article Four of Regulations Issued by the State Council on 20 Septenlber 1983 
for the Inlplementation of the Law ofthe People's Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign Joint 
Ventures is a good example: 
"A joint venture that applies for establishment sha11 emphasize econornic results and satisfy one 
or more of the following requirements: 
(1) It will adopt advanced technology and equipment andωientific managerial 
techniques , enabling it to increase the variety of its products, Ïn1prove their quality and 
raise output, and to conserve energy and materials~ 
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(2) It wiU benefit the technical renovation (sic) of the venture, and achieve quick results 
and large profits wÌth a small investment; 
(3) It will be able to expand the export of its products and increase foreign exchange 
earnings; and 
(4) It wi lI be able to train technical and managerial personne1." 
lnnumerable small books and pamphlets pub1ished by goverrun.ent bodies were aimed 
at helping foreign investors learn how to become involved in China. One such publication 
(Chu Baot缸， 1986, 37-38) includes the following description: 
"The Chinese side expects [investors from overseas] to transfer .. . as much advanced 
technology as possible, using such technology as their investment. If they do not have 
the know-how, they can contribute cash in foreign exchange as investment, which can 
be used by the joint venture to pay for the advanced equipment and know-how it needs. 
Bringing in advanced technology and equipment from abroad enables the joint venture 
to combine the strong points of the Chinese and foreign participants and gain vantage 
position in n1arket competition. But the Chinese side does not expect the foreign side 
to contribute as investment things already available in China. ... From the Crunese point 
of view, the investment in kind from the foreign side should preferably be specialized 
equipment. " 
Potential foreign investors in any country are motivated by a variety of factors relating 
to the comparative costs of capital, labour and natural resources in the home and host countries 
and the comparative size and potential spending power of the lnarkets. Specifically, on the 
push side, an investor would be interested in investing abroad if resources are not available or 
are costly in his own country, and/or equipment costs and wages are high, and/or the market 
is lin1ited in some way. On the pull side, investors would be interested ín establishing 
operations abroad if natural resources were readily available, and/or capital equipment could 
be procured cheaply, \vages were low, and/or ifthe host market (or a third country's quota言 i.e. ，
using the host country to circumvent the trade barriers of another country) were very attractive. 
The bottom line is that companies decide to invest abroad if they perceive they can make 
substantial savings in their production costs and/or sell much greater quantities oftheir products 
than they can in their home markets. 
However, insofar as China is concerned , Japanese investors have not been motivated 
solely by business and market forces. Sino-Japanese relations are very complex due to a 
variety of historìcal and political factors. During World War II Japanese soldiers destroyed 
many Chinese cities and tortured and murdered thousands of civilians. Though the atrocities 
were committed over fifty years ago , on the Japanese side there remains some guilt, and on the 
Chinese, a strong feeling that Japan has yet to cOlnpensate fully for the economic and social 
damage wrought. Thus it is not surprising that when the door opened, the Chinese held 
especially high expectations for Japanese investment. Many Chinese complain that the Japanese 
companies have not brought China their latest production techniques and are continuing to 
exploit the country. 
lt is virtually an impossible task to determine whether the technology given by one 
country to another is modern , for "nlodern" is relative. ln the absence of cOlnprehensive and 
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authoritative surveys it is possible to make only a few general observations and to consider the 
results of several sma11 surveys undertaken by various analysts. 
Firstly, Japanese investment in China only rea11y began in 1984. Given the very 
backward state of China' s economy when the door was first opened, this is a relatively short 
period of time on which to make an objective assessment. Secondly, it is wrong to examine 
Japan' s contribution to China's modernization strictly in terms of technology. Over half of a11 
official aid to China has COlTIe frOlTI Japan. In the early 1980s the Japanese Overseas Economic 
Cooperation Fund began to offer yen credits to China which were to be used for infrastructural 
development. These were the first loans that China accepted from a foreign country since the 
loans from the USSR in the 1950s. The Japanese Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund is the 
largest lender to China, providing mor巳 than the World Bank and Asian Development Bank. 
The Export-Import Bank of Japan has also extended to China vast sums for the development 
of natural resources. Interestingly , a Chinese economist who set out to determine whether or 
not China has received a fair share of the world' s investment discovered that it was in fact only 
Japan which seemed to contribute an "adequate" amount, while four other major source 
countries, the United States, Germany , France and the United Kingdom, did not (Wei , 1995 , 
187). 
Japan' s bestowal of such vast amounts of aid are certainly related to the above-
n1entioned guilt factor , but it is also readily conceded in Japanese publications that such aid is 
used to prepare the way for investors (Hatch, 1995 , 297). As Japan has been so heavily 
involved in China' s largest infrastructure projects, some would say that Japan has had an unfair 
edge because of a11 the aid. According to United States government personnel and Japanese 
Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund officials, hovvever, investors from other countries have 
had equal opportunity to participate in these projects (Clifford, 1993 , 32). 
Thirdly型 as far as the degree of sophistication of the technology transferred to date is 
concerned, Japan' s transferal of whole industrial plants has given China not only hardware but 
software. Yokoi (1990, 696) has traced the output growth of several production processes in 
which the Japanese have invested and found that China's world ranking is high lTIuch in part 
to Japanese efforts. "ln particular, Japan contributed to the establishrnent of China' s modern 
industries, including iron and steel , electric-power generation, non-ferrous metals, 
petrochelnicals, fertilizers , synthetic fibres , electric equipment and electronics." Granted, there 
were other factors at work which would have also contributed to increasing output levels, but 
without doubt, Japanese money and training were pivotal. According to Campbell (1987 , 72) , 
who conducted a survey of 115 foreign con1panies in Beijing in 1985 , Japanese companies had 
more employees in situ than any other country, and were given the most encouragement to 
learn Chinese. 
In 1986, as a goodwill measure, the Japanese government established the Japan-China 
Investment Promotion Association, and in 1990 a Chinese counterpart was founded. The author 
is unable to comment upon their success, although it is known without doubt, that in the early 
1980s Japan and other investing countries were greatly hampered in transferring modern 
technology to China by the policies of The North Atlantic A11iance Coordinating Committee 
for Export Control to Communist Areas (COCOM) whose lnandate was to prevent the spread 
of strategic technology.These policies were relaxed in 19869but thcHToshiba Case ,, inMay 
1987, in which Toshiba Machine Company was barred from selling in China for one year 
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because it exported unauthorized technologies and machines, fuelled anti-Japanese sentiment. 
Fourthly, as for quantities of Japanese technology , China is not the least favoured 
recipient. According to a recent report written by the Japanese Science and Technology 
Agency , over the 1993/4 fiscal year, Korea had the largest number of technology imports at 
104, followed by the US at 100, China at 80, Taiwan at 52 and Thailand at 32. ("Korea 
Emerges as Japan's No. 1 Tech Exporting Country" , 1996). According to Yokoi (1996, 151) 型
between 1981 and 1988 Japan supplied only 80/0 of China' s technology itnports, but in 1992 
and 1993 this increased to 20-30%. 
Understandably, Japanese companies have had serious concerns about transferring 
technology to China. (Chinese suspicions about the low level of technology were borne out by 
Campbell (1 987, 71) , who points out that while, on average, 67% of the foreign companies 
agreed that "a key success factor is to offer your latest technology ," and 720/0 of the Alnerican 
firms agreed要 only 61 010 of the Japanese firms held this view). However, having few natural 
resources of her own, Japan was forced to lnake exports of manufactured goods the foundation 
of her economic growth strategy. Given the combination of China's low production costs, 
especially labour costs, and poor record for patent and copyright protection, small Japanese 
companies in particular, have feared economic collapse should China learn to produce certain 
export items. Japan is not alone in her cautious approach. According to one survey, 5.8 years 
elapse before multinational companies make their first transfer of technology to subsidiaries in 
developed countries, 9.8 years to subsidiaries in developing countries and 13.1 years for outside 
licensing agreements and joint ventures (Mansfield and Romeo , 1980). 
ln some cases, Japanese companies may well have wanted to transfer higher technology , 
but were hampered by the many factors frustrating all foreign investors in China, namely, poor 
infrastructure, including unreliable energy supply and transport, shortages of good quality 
materials, prolonged bureaucratic wrangling, Party interference, lack of skilled Chinese labour, 
lack of good interpreters, lack of a strong legal system型 tight availability of foreign exchange, 
dubious accounting procedures, etc. (Whiting, 1989, 109-111 ; Macleod, 1988, 14-38; Kleinberg, 
1990, 221-245.) 
It is clearly evident from examining Japan's investment patterns in Asia as a whole that 
reducing production costs, especially labour costs, has been a pritnary motive in choosing 
location and type of production (Yoshihara, 1978; Awanohara, 1989; Tokunaga, 1992 and 
Healey, 1991). Japanese companies first went to the NIES , then to four ASEAN countries 
(Thailand, Malaysia, lndonesia and the Philippines), and most recently to China and Vietnam 
The choice of these countries was, of course, influenced strongly by the political stability, the 
incentives offered by the host country, and availability of some measure of infrastructure. It 
is very likely that Japan would have begun investing earlier in China had the political 
environment been better. That the growth rate of Japan' s exports to China has been slowing 
down while that of FDl has been increasing would seem to support the argument that Japanese 
companies are interested in using relatively cheap Chinese labour to produce Japanese products. 
1 t could also indicate that another key 1110tivation for Japanese investors is a growing market. 
No statistics are available showing by sector the proportion of output from foreign 
enterprises in China which has been exported. The results of a survey carried out in 1990 
suggested that initially Japanese companies were most interested in producing goods for export 
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from China, but later when Chinese citizens had more spending power, they changed their focus 
to the host country market (Taylor, 1993 , 320. Quoting a JETRO survey) . 1n 1993 an 
economist from the Nomura Research Institute, discussing the surge of Japanese Ïnvestment in 
China in the 1990s, explained it is due to the perception "that the promise of China as a market 
has finally turned into reality" and companies "aren't investing to export to the United States 
and Europe anymore、 but to take advantage of the local market" (Sender, 1996, 47). A survey 
of forty .Tapanese companies investing in China carried out in 1995 found that the third and 
fourth most important factors affecting their decision to invest in China after "political stability" 
and "continuation of the open door policy" were the fflocal potential market" and "expected 
growth rate of the Chinese economy and market" (Tang, 54-56). 
Conclusion 
The first task of this paper was to gain a better understanding of the effect of .T apanese 
FD1 on .Tapanese exports to China. 扎1ultiple regression analysls seclned to indicate that for 
manufacturing exports as a whole between 1980 and 1994, FD1 was not an inf1uencing factor. 
This also was true for the textile products, electrical machinery, non-ferrous metal products, 
transportation equiprnent and general machinery sectors. 1n each case the FDI coefficient was 
insignificant while varîous other variables were highly significant. The only two sectors in 
which FDI did seem to inf1 uence exports were food products and chemical products. A 
chronological review of the export and FDI data revealed that the trends of both were highly 
erratic, due rnainly to political factors in China, but that generally speaking, the growth rate of 
exports to China was decreasing, while the annual growth rate of FDI was increasing. 
The second purpose of this paper was, in the context of Japanese FDI , to comment on 
Chinese expectations for and assessment of Japanese technology transferaL Many Chinese 
people believe that .Tapanese companies have not been providing their most efficient 
technologies. This is backed up by the Campbell Survey (1987). Evidence, however多 from
several other researchers seems to indicate that Japan' s investment has had a strong positive 
effect on rals1ng output levels of many products, and that the nUlnber of technologies 
transferred from Japan to China is relatively high. Most countries do not transfer technology 
to other countries soon after it has been brought into use in the home country. Japan is not 
unique in this respec t. 
Having little in the way of natural resources, Japan has based her success on the 
manufacturing of goods for export. Logically, Japanese companies would not undermine their 
own survival by sharing new technologies indiscriminately \vith other countries, particularly one 
possessing a combination of low production costs, especially low labour costs, and a reputation 
for poor patent protection. 
By way of tying the two parts of the paper together, the findings in the tìrst part that 
export growth to China has been declining while FD1 growth has been rising, and that in most 
sectors FDI did not in f1uence , let alone stimulate exports, could suggest that Japanese 
cOill_panies have in recent years been manufacturing more in China than in Japan, and 
concomitantly, bringing more technology into China. The fact that lTIOre Japanese-supervised 
production is occurring in China can only mean that China wi lI benefit fronl lllore and a wider 
variety of J apanese technology and expertise. 
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36 (8/96)CPPS lnstitutional Foundations for a Just Society Dr. Lok-sang Ho 
37 (9/96)CPPS Piece Rate Payment Schemes and the Professor John S. Heywood 
Elnployment of Women: Thc Case of Hong and Dr. Xiangdong Wei 
Kong 
38 (1 0/96)CPPS Public Policy on Local Administration in Hong Dr. Yiu-chung Wong 
Kong: Past, Present and Future 
39 (11196)CPPS Occupational Stress Among Factory Workers in 恥1s . Oi-ling Siu 
Hong Kong and China: A Comparison Study 
40 (12/96)CPPS V/age Subsidies as a Labour Market Policy Tool Dr. Lok -sang Ho 
41 (l 3/96)CAPS Political Pragmatism on the Chinese Canlpus Dr. Che-po Chan 
since 1989 
42 (14/96)CPPS Delayed Compensation and the Hiring of Older Professor John S. Heywood 
Workers: Evidence from Hong Kong Dr. Lok -sang Ho 
Dr. Xiangdong Wei 
43 (l 5/96)CAPS lnlpacts of Foreign Policies on the Gains from Dr. Thomas Voon 
Research and ProlTIotion 
No. 豆豆豆 Author 
44 (16/96)CPPS Hedonic Pricing for Prawn and Shrimp in the Dr. Thomas Voon 
Philippines 
45 (1/97) CAPS China and the Prospects for Economic Professor Y. Y. Kueh 
Integration within APEC 
46 (2月7) CAPS Export Competition .Among China and ASEAN Dr. Thonlas J. V oon 
in the US Market: Application of Market Share Dr. Xiangdong Wei 
Models 
47 (3/97) CAPS Hong Kong' s Outward Processing Investment in Dr. Kui-yin Cheung 
China: Its Implications on Hong Kong Economy 
48 (4/97) CAPS China - Taiwan' s Trade and Investment Dr. K. C. Lei 
Relations and their Impact on Taiwan's Income 
Distribution 
49 (5/97) CAPS Overseas Chinese and F oreign Investment in Dr. C. Simon Fan 
China: An Application of the Transaction Cost 
Approach 
50 (6月7) CAPS Japanese FDI , Exports and Technology Transfer Dr. EIspeth Thomson 
to China 
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